Abstract This paper uses firm-level data recorded in the Amadeus database to investigate the distribution of labor productivity in different European countries. We find that the upper tail of the empirical productivity distributions follows a decaying power-law, whose exponent α is obtained by a semi-parametric estimation technique recently developed by Clementi et al. (2006) . The emergence of "fat tails" in productivity distribution has already been detected in Di Matteo et al. (2005) and explained by means of a model of social network. Here we show that this model is tested on a broader sample of countries having different patterns of social network structure. These different social attitudes, measured using a social capital indicator, reflect in the power-law exponent estimates, verifying in this way the existence of linkages among firms' productivity performance and social network. Finally, we study the relationships of aggregate productivity growth with social capital and the tail exponents.
Introduction
A consistent flow of research on firms' and workers' productivity regarding the topic of technology innovation and diffusion has focused on generation and transmission of innovations through networks of firms (Pittaway et al., 2004) , or on the relationship among social capital and productivity performance (Cohen and Prusak, 2001) .
1 As highlighted in Di Matteo et al. (2005) , firms' network plays a decisive role in the imitation process of the innovative firms through which, according to the evolutionary literature perspective, innovations originally conceived by a given firm percolate outside it by imitation from other firms. In this way the innovation flows through the network of contacts and communications between firms. The significance of the underlying connection network comes into sight when the collective dynamics of the system is considered. As showed in several studies, above a certain threshold of complexity, natural, artificial, and social systems are typically characterized by networks with power-law degree distribution, i.e. "scale-free" networks (see e.g. Albert and Barabási, 2002) . In very recent times, network theory gained momentum in explaining firms' performance also from a technical perspective. The amazingly rapid progress that took place in information technologies since the mid of '90s accounts for a noteworthy proportion of productivity growth. Contemporarily, it also broadened the role of networks in determining firms' labor productivity performances. The conjunct use of information networks along supply or customer chains pushed toward a higher specialization and improvement of skills in labor force and, in general, leaded to remarkable changes in the competences needed within firms in order to maintain competitiveness on the market (Motohashi, 2007) .
In this paper we extend the analysis of the relationship among network and productivity in two directions. First, we exploit the link between social capital, social network, and productivity distribution among firms. We do not limit our analysis to the firms' network (see e.g. Ahuja, 2000) , but we embed it in the study of social network characteristics, treating therefore also the noneconomic aspects that determine the social environment in which firms operate and interact. According to Granovetter (2005) , the social network influences firms' productivity through different channels: the mutual acceptance and the prizing of technical skills inside the community of workers within a firm; the control exerted among colleagues, that determines the quality of the effort and, therefore, the efficiency of single workers in a way analogous to principalagent models; the interpersonal ties, inside and outside the firms, enforced by repeated interaction, that lead to a level of trust that eases the interrelations and the flow of information.
The second aspect of novelty consists in the method of analysis. Indeed, the impact of social network structure on productivity is quantitatively evaluated by means of labor productivity distribution features, in order to verify whether and to which extent social systems and social capital favor the circulation of information and innovation through networks of firms. The differences recorded among firms' productivity levels within a country determine the shape of productivity distribution. As evidenced by Coleman (1988) , stronger network ties make the circulation of information faster and less expensive. This, in turn, may reduce the gap in performances across firms by favoring the transmission of knowledge and innovations, and thus leading to a more even distribution of productivity among firms. Therefore, in this paper we investigate how differences in social capital reflect into disparities in productivity distribution shapes and parameters.
The study proceeds as follows: in Section 2, it is examined whether labor productivity follows a power-law distribution in a sample of 9 European countries. This assessment is of particular interest, since the sample of countries in object are not homogeneous from both an economic and a social point of view. The presence of power-law tails in such different contexts might reveal that this emergence does not depend on a particular underlying social structure, but it is consistent over different systems. The estimates of the power-law exponent are here obtained by means of the technique introduced by Clementi et al. (2006) . This method adopts a subsample semi-parametric bootstrap algorithm for optimally selecting the number of extreme quantiles to be used in the upper tail estimation, and thus ending up with less ambiguous estimates of the exponent α. Furthermore, we model the network of firms along the lines of Di Matteo et al. (2005 , but see also Di Matteo et al., 2004 : the use of this model allows to get a quantitative measure of the role of the underlying network of firms in determining the shape of productivity distribution. According to this work, the emergence of "fat-tailed" distributions may be interpreted as the outcome of an analogous structure of the network, which must show slow decaying tails in its degree distribution, and, therefore, a "scale-free" type behavior.
3 In Section 3, the link between networks of firms and social networks is illustrated by comparing the tail exponents of the labor productivity distributions to a social capital indicator by country, and also testing if social capital influences the aggregate growth of productivity. Finally, Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Power-law decay in productivity distribution Our aim here is to perform tail parameter estimations on labor productivity data through a recently developed method. The labor productivity is defined as added value over the amount of employees (where added value, defined according to standard balance sheet reporting, is the difference between total revenue and cost of inputs excluding the cost of labor). The results are used in the remainder of this section to link our empirical findings to a model of firms' interaction across a complex network.
Data and methodology
In this paper we have used the Amadeus database, compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing.
4 This data source contains firm-level data from all over Europe, and is available in different sizes. Firms in this study are taken from the "TOP 250,000 Module", including companies that fulfill one of three criteria regarding the magnitude of operating revenues, total assets, and the number of employees.
5 The analysis is based on 10 years of data (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) for 9 countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom); for some of them (Germany and Italy) we have also used data by geographical sub-areas (East/West Germany and North/South Italy, respectively). The number of observations for each year and country is shown in Table 1 . It should be noted that the number of companies for all countries is lower in 1996 and 2005 compared to all other years in the time span. Therefore, results from these years should be used with caution, since they might not be completely reliable.
From these data we have calculated the empirical complementary cumulative distributions (P ≥ (x), being the probability to find a firm with productivity larger than or equal to x), which show a very clear linear trend for large values of x in a log-log scale, implying a non-Gaussian character with the probability for large productivities well described by a power-law behavior, i.e. P ≥ (x) ∼ x −α . To extract the value of α we have used Clementi et al.'s (2006) subsample semi-parametric bootstrap algorithm for data-driven selection of the number of observations located in the tail of the distribution. This technique relies on the popular Hill's (1975) maximum likelihood estimator for the tail index α, given by
where n is the sample size, m the number of observations in the tail of the distribution, and the sample elements are put in descending order:
. As well known, the main problem connected with the Hill's estimator is the decision about an appropriate tail size, i.e. the number of observations m included in the calculation of α n . This choice is accomplished by the authors through minimisation of the finite-sample mean squared error (MSE) of the estimator (1), so that an optimal m is defined by
where α n is an initial estimate from the original sample, and α
is the estimate obtained using the bootstrapped datasets drawn from a smoothed parametric distribution of n 1 ≤ n observations belonging to the null hypothesis of a complete sequence of goodness-of-fit tests for Pareto-type tail behavior.
6 Since MSE comprises the variance and bias of the estimator, the optimal estimate α * n -making use of m * observations lying in the tail-will be in this way a balance between the former (which usually decreases with increasing tail size) and the latter (which tends to increase with tail size).
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The estimates of the tail exponent obtained by applying the semi-parametric technique can be seen in Table 2 . The power-law distribution returns a very good fit, and this result is persistent over time and countries. Nevertheless, point estimates are suggestive of slight differences among years and countries:
6 In the work of Clementi et al., the number of bootstrap replications R was chosen without any formal justification. We adopt here an automated three-step method of choosing R with the desired level of accuracy recently developed by Andrews and Buchinsky (2000) . Accuracy is measured by the percentage deviation of the estimate based on R bootstrap simulations from the corresponding ideal bootstrap quantity for which R = ∞. 7 Hill himself devised a data-analytic method for choosing m * . He noted that appropriateness of the Pareto's assumption for the tail implies that the samples
, are approximatively distributed as centered exponential variables, i.e. according to an exponential distribution with unit expectation and variance. Therefore, as recommended by Hill, one might carry out a sequence of goodness-of-fit tests on these exponential samples, and stop when they start to fail the test, taking m * equal to the largest value of m which provides a satisfactory exponential fit. The application of this procedure to our productivity data resulted in overestimation of the tail exponent compared to the semi-parametric bootstrap algorithm. This appears to empirically support Hall and Welsh's (1985) argument of a very gradual deterioration of the exponential approximation, leading Hill's method to largely overestimate m (and thus α by Eq. (1)). for example, for some countries (Belgium, West Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) we observe relatively homogeneous entries for the tail indices, while for other countries (Finland, France, East Germany, and Spain) the estimate of α has a tendency to decrease in time; exceptions to these temporal patterns are Germany, Italy, North and South Italy, and Netherlands, for which the value of α shows a sharp decrease around the beginning of the current decade. However, the time interval under investigation is too short to decide whether these differences are due to major economic and/or politicalinstitutional changes which could have led to a change of the extremal part of the distributions. 
Power-law-tailed distributions in firms' interaction networks
Di Matteo et al. (2005) have provided a simple model of technological change through a social network of interactions between firms to explain the occurrence of power-law tails in the empirically observed productivity distributions. The general idea behind this work is that a productivity-increasing technological innovation, originally introduced and adopted by a certain firm, can spread over time to other firms by imitation if they interact through a "scale-free" type network with degree distribution given by p (k) ∼ k −(α+1) . The model predicts that the aggregate distribution for the productivity of the ensemble of firms is given by a normalized sum of Gaussians with averages distributed according with the connectivity in the network of interactions among firms. Therefore, it is the special structure of the underlying network, having slow decaying tails in its degree distribution, which shapes the aggregate productivity 8 For a more in-depth investigation of the tail behavior, we have also used the α-stable model as a method to analyze our data. α-stable distributions are known to be very efficient in modeling distributions with long non-Gaussian tails (see e.g. Feller, 1971 , for more of the mathematical properties of stable laws). The general α-stable distribution requires four parameters for complete description: a tail index α ∈ (0, 2]; a skewness parameter β ∈ [−1, 1]; a scale parameter γ > 0; a location parameter δ ∈ R. Maximum likelihood estimations of stable distribution parameters were performed using the software package Stable by Nolan (1997 Nolan ( , 1999a Nolan ( ,b, 2001 , available for free download at: http://academic2.american.edu/ ∼ jpnolan/stable/stable.html. In particular, we noticed that only in a small number of cases the 95% confidence intervals of the semi-parametric tail index estimates extend to the realm of stable laws, and that in a more limited number of cases the tail index estimates calculated from the stable model are in a somewhat close accordance with the semi-parametric ones. But this is to be expected, since semi-parametric tail index estimation provides a tight fit of the distribution outer parts, whereas the stable law parameters are selected to approximate the entire shape of the empirical distribution (DuMouchel, 1983; Lux, 1996) . Here we extend the analysis to actual empirical evidence coming from our dataset of firms fulfilling the "TOP 250,000 Module" inclusion criteria (see note 5). Figs. 1 and 2 show the log-log plot of the complementary cumulative distributions of labor productivity corresponding to the years 1996-2005 for two different countries: Belgium and the United Kingdom.
10 We find a 9 In the "TOP 1.5 million Module", British, French, German, Italian, Russian, Spanish and Ukrainian companies are included if they satisfy at least one of the following criteria: operating revenues bigger than 1.5 million e; total assets bigger than 3 million e; number of employees bigger than 20. For all other countries, companies are included if their operation revenue is bigger than 1 million e, or total assets are bigger than 2 million e, or the number of employees is bigger than 15. 10 Productivity data have been deflated by using the implicit GDP deflator (2000 = 100) taken from the OECD Statistics Portal (www.oecd.org/statistics/). quantitatively good agreement by considering an underlying scale-free network with degree distribution given by p (k) ∝ k −(α+1) exp (−β/k), averages k (1) l = m + z l n directly proportional to the number of connections z l that each firm l has in the network, and variance equal to σ. We note that, although there are several parameters to calibrate, the tail behavior of the theoretical distribution is controlled only by the power-law exponent α, while in the small and medium ranges the other parameters have a larger influence. From our analysis we observe that the theoretical curves (drawn as solid lines) fit well the empirical findings by assuming α = 0.84, m = 33, n = 20, σ = 16, and β = 0.5 for Belgium, and α = 0.88, m = 24, n = 11, σ = 16, and β = 0.6 for the United Kingdom. Very good levels of agreement (not shown here but available upon request) have also been obtained for the other countries considered in our study; the parameters used for the theoretical curves are shown in Table 3 . Notice that, although there is still matching between the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings, the numerical values we need to theoretically approximate the shape of the East German empirical distributions in an appropriate way are somewhat different from those of the other countries. This might be due to the limited number of entries this geographical area accounts for over the entire period of investigation, which shapes the Table 3 Values of the theoretical parameters for all countries and geographical sub-areas. productivity distributions differently than the others, especially in their outer parts.
innovation and technological information flow more rapidly and with lower costs (Granovetter, 1985) . Firms' productivity, therefore, results more evenly distributed, and the and the power-law exponents increase. The verification of this hypothesis introduces an original way to investigate the relation among social capital of a country and economic performance at aggregate level, since countries with different levels of social capital should display as well a different power-law exponent in labor productivity distribution.
By social capital we mean the 'features of social life-networks, norms, and trust, that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives' (Putnam, 1995, pp. 664-665) . This definition supports the choice of performing a country-level analysis, since a nation is supposed to represent a homogeneous sample as regards social network and institutional aspects. Besides, Putnam (2000) stresses the relevance of social capital in improving the performance of individuals, since it puts them in a connected network. Indeed, social networks are often identified by specialized literature as the "structure" of social capital (e.g. Burt, 2000) , concept that is well specified by Bourdieu (1996, p. 249) : 'The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent [. . . ] depends on the size of the network of connections that he can effectively mobilize'. In order to obtain a synthetic indicator, empirical analyses usually adopt international surveys. Along the lines of most of these works, we employ the World Values Survey (WVS ), a data source designed to enable a crossnational/cross-cultural comparison of values and norms in a wide variety of areas, and to monitor changes in values and attitudes in societies all over the world.
11 In particular, we refer to the latest available wave of the WVS (see note 8) by adopting as a social capital measure the trust, quantified by the percentage of interviewed people who agree to the assertion that "most people can be trusted". According to Knack and Keefer (1997) and Sabatini (2006) , among others, this quantity is likely to be deeply related with economic and productivity performances.
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On Fig. 3 we plotᾱ, the average of the power-law exponent estimates for each country over the period under investigation shown in the last column of Table 2 , as a function of the level of trust.
13 By observing the graph, one can notice that a that a tendency toward a positive trend seems to emerge between the average value of the estimates of power-law exponents and the level of trust. However, given the low number of cases included in the analysis, it is not possible to infer any further conclusions. Nonetheless, some deviations from this trend are present. In particular, we have calculated the correlation coefficient between these two variables, which results positive but significant (at 95% condfidence level) only if Germany and Italy are excluded from the computation, 14 pointing in this way to an outlying behavior of these West Germany, South Italy, Netherlands, and Spain). As regards East Germany, the mean is computed considering all values, since anyway the number of observations is always less than 1000. Notice that the choice to use the average value of the estimates permits to smooth temporary variations (that in some countries-e.g. Germany, Italy, and Netherlands-are not negligible), and it is likely to be more appropriate to enable comparison with the wave of WVS data we use, since this data collection was undertaken in the central years of the period under analysis for firms.
14 The pairwise linear correlation coefficient is 0.28, with an estimated p-value for testing the hypothesis of no correlation equal to 0.46; however, once Germany and countries, which indeed reveal an average value of the power-law exponent significantly higher compared to the other countries. A possible explanation of this behavior involves the particular heterogeneity within each country. The aggregates of these two countries are actually the sum of two different social networks and economic systems: East and West for Germany, North and South for Italy. 15 The average values of the tail index estimations for the above-mentioned levels of geographical disaggregation is shown in the last column of Table 2 . As regards Germany, the value of trust is somewhat bigger in the Eastern part (48.3% against 40.7% of the West), but it should be noted that at the beginning of the period under observation for firms the percentages of trust were 24.3 for the East and 39.9 for the West, respectively (1997 WVS data).
16 During this time, firms in East Germany were catching up Western ones: the aggregate labor productivity of East Germany (as a percentage of the West Germany's level) progresses from 45% in 1990 to approximatively 70% in 2002 (Uhlig, 2006) ; simultaneously, the power-law exponent estimates of the Eastern firms' productivity distribution results lower at the end of the period of observation with respect to the beginning, while they remain substantially stable in West Germany.
17 If considered togheter, these matters suggest that the improvement in Eastern workers' productivity has been accompanied by a relevant integration of the different social networks and an increase of the differences between firms in the initially disadvantaged area. Therefore, a Schumpeterian mechanism seems to be at work here: not all firms took advantage from the new body of technologies and information available. In particular, the augmented level of social trust did not determine a generalized improvement in firms' productivity due to the massive migration of workers towards the West and, consequently, the difficulties for Eastern firms in hiring skilled workers. According to Cooper (1999) , 18 this networking problem is at the root of the slowdown in the catching-up process observed after 2002. In other words, over a certain starting threshold of heterogeneity, even a remarkable improvement in social capital has limited or no effect on the network structure, the communication among weakly connected points being problematic (the "structural holes" proposed by Burt). As regards Italy, given the unavailability of geographical sub-area survey data, no definitive conclusions can be drawn from the disaggregation analysis, even though the average Italy have been excluded from the calculation, the estimated correlation coefficient and p-value are 0.86 and 0.01, respectively. 15 See Vecernik (2003) for Germany, and Di Giacinto and Nuzzo (2006) for Italy. 16 These results do not differ greatly from the values of immediate pre-unification period. Indeed, East and West Germany's 1990 WVS percent levels of trust equaled to 20.1 and 31.1, respectively. 17 A word of caution is needed here due to the low number of observations for East Germany.
18 But see also Rosenfeld et al. (2004) on the related question of "clusterization" of Eastern firms. level of power-law exponent for Northern firms is slightly lower.
In order to check if this relationship between social capital and firms' productivity distribution translates into better aggregate productivity performance, the percent level of trust has been put into relation with the growth of multifactor productivity (MFP ).
19 As it is evident from Fig. 4 , no significant relationship appears to emerge.
20 Therefore, at this stage it is not possible to state that higher levels of trust correspond to larger growth in productivity.
Finally, we have also checked if a relationship exists among the average of tail exponent estimates and the average growth of MFP, but we find no relationship. To gain deeper insights, an analysis by economic activity sector and market concentration level is required, but at the present stage of study it goes beyond the purpose of the present work.
Conclusions
In this work we have detected the emergence of power-law tails in labor productivity distributions for 9 European countries and different time periods. We have modeled the empirical labor productivity distributions with the model introduced by Di Matteo et al. (2005) , and compared its outcomes with the empirical power-law exponents estimated by means of Clementi et al.'s (2006) algorithm. The model has been validated for all cases, confirming that powerlaw tails can emerge from scale-free contact-networks. Moreover, we have investigated the relationship between productivity distribution features and social trust, evidencing a tendency toward a positive relationship between the mean values of the power-law exponents of labor productivity and the level of trust. However, the data appear scattered and, given the reduced number of points, it is not possible to draw any definitive conclusions. Analogous considerations can be sketched for the relationship among the level of trust and the aggregate growth of productivity as measured by multifactor productivity.
